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The following work explores the impact of HUAC propaganda on rural settings, 
specifically using a case study of Ames, Iowa in 1961.  Between March and June 1961, Ames 
hosted showings of two films entitled Communism on the Map and Operation Abolition, both 
produced by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).  When approaching the 
Cold War, many historians have focused upon developments in large urban centers and the 
politics behind policies. By studying the events of 1961, this work widens the Cold War 
historiography which is severely lacking in discussion of rural communities.   
Ames, Iowa became the epicenter of a hysterical ideological struggle, after a local citizen 
reported his concerns to the Federal Bureau of Investigations. These concerns pertained to the 
Iowa State University student body reacting improperly to the screening of HUAC propaganda 
films. HUAC intended the films to spread alarm over supposed communist subversion, but a 
significant number of students at the university felt outraged at the films. In turn, their protests 
seemed to confirm the worst fears of the community’s anti-communists, that young people and 
untrustworthy Americans failed to take seriously the threat of subversion.  This event showcases 
the deep ideological divides which were deepening between anti-communists and those who 
rejected HUAC’s message.    
 The events in Ames sparked debates in local newspapers, where students, faculty, and 
community members discussed the merits of anti-communism and the constitutionality of HUAC 
itself.  The Iowa State Daily, Ames Daily Tribune, and the Des Moines Register encapsulated the 
community’s worries, opinions and outrage in a time when the entire nation was on edge over 
Cold War politics and domestic identity. Anti-communists also voiced their concerns directly to 
Iowa State University’s president.  The beliefs of rural anti-communists as well as their anti-
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HUAC counterparts echoed opinions felt on a national scale. This case-study thus yields a more 
inclusionary interpretation of the Cold War that understands rural and small-town Americans as 


















CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The 1960s were an ideologically formative decade for the United States. The civil rights 
and feminism movements fought to change the perceptions of rights for all members of 
American society.  As these movements were escalating unrest on the home front, international 
tensions were rising between the United States and the U.S.S.R.  The threat of outright war 
between these superpowers increased already outstanding ideological conflicts between 
communism and capitalism. This brought the conflict to the forefront of discussions across the 
United States.  With tensions on the rise, the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
(HUAC) began to increase its national presence.  From its origin in 1938, HUAC had aimed for 
the direct management of American values, specifically working to root out what its mission 
defined as un-American values. HUAC and its supporters believed that the real threat to 
American society lay in a large network of communist subversion, a danger that traditional 
judicial processes were ill equipped to handle.  HUAC believed that communist subversion was 
efficient at skirting around the law. Accordingly, by 1954, as the Communist Control Act 
brought about the criminalization of communist party membership, HUAC began pursuing a new 
strategy to preserve American society.  HUAC hoped to transform most citizens into vigilant 
patriots, ready to report to authorities any suspicious behaviors that might be indicators of 
communist subversion. To help convince the American public to confront the direct threat of 
communist subversion, HUAC created a series of propaganda films in 1961. Those movies, 
Communism on the Map and Operation Abolition, were intended to scare Americans into 
supporting HUAC’s efforts and create a network of informants.  Across the nation, however, the 
unsubtle propaganda in these films led skeptics and political opponents to criticize HUAC and its 
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methods. Throughout the material that HUAC produced, the organization rarely specified the 
definition of what was “American” beyond general statements about being a red-blooded, 
middle-class citizen. On balance, however, the net effect of propaganda effectively made it plain 
to the public what was considered un-American.  This work will use HUAC’s clear definition of 
un-American beliefs and behavior to show the boundaries of American identity and help to 
create a clearer picture of rural America during the height of the Cold War.   
When HUAC began looking into communist subversion in the United States, the 
organization created a binary structure of what was American and Un-American.  Even within its 
title: House Un-American Activities Committee, it is apparent that the focus was upon Un-
American rather than American qualities.  The philosophy relied on generalized guidelines about 
what was considered American, including principles of support for democracy, Christian piety 
and American international policies.  What little definition that these guidelines gave to HUAC’s 
“American” values was intentionally left open to interpretation, allowing the group to cast a wide 
net. The Committee’s refusal to define what being an American meant reinforced the idea of its 
pseudo-judicial nature and helped HUAC to adapt to changing international politics and the 
perceived domestic threats. While the U.S. judicial system requires accusers to prove guilt, 
HUAC’s methods expected targets to prove themselves innocent of un-American behavior.1 
Essentially, a person who was accused of being a communist or communist sympathizer had to 
prove their loyalty without knowing the exact line between what was considered patriotism and 
what could be seen as suspiciously covering for guilt.  The line between guilty and innocent was 
difficult to draw, and, in many cases, the right answer was both incriminating and proof of 
“Americanness”.  One such example was Americans’ opposition to fascism during World War 
 
1 Davies, Powell, The Urge to Persecute (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953), 17. 
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II. After the United States entered the war, many citizens reacted to the political climate by 
joining anti-fascist leagues, many of which were managed by communists.2  Such formerly 
permissible and even well-regarded associations might turn into a condemning scar on one’s 
character down the road, as national and international politics evolved.   
The Cold War changed how Americans drew societal boundaries, especially in relation to 
perceived political deviation from the norm. Early in the Cold War, anti-communist movements 
and organizations set the boundaries on “Americanness”, by launching accusatory actions against 
non-conformists.  However, as these ideological structures began to lose the hearts and minds of 
Americans in the 1960s, advocates often doubled down on their ideology. Rural centers, already 
on the fringes of urban society, became ideological battlegrounds between the old and new.  
Ames, Iowa was one of these rural centers which felt this ideological conflict to its core.   As 
tensions rose over the propaganda that HUAC sent out to reinforce American ideology, so did 
the discourse in local newspapers.  Concerns escalated and culminated in the 1961 denunciation 
of local Iowa State University professor Elbert B. Smith, an episode that reveals the deep 
ideological differences plaguing America at a turning point in the Cold War. This case study 
reveals Iowa to be a deeply divided society in 1961, where at least some citizens worried that the 





2 Powell, The Urge to Persecute, 20-21.  
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CHAPTER 2. HUAC AND ANTI-SUBVERSION CAMPAIGNS 
 The focus of HUAC, like McCarthy’s rhetoric or the aims of the John Birch Society, was 
to root out communism and persecute those who were clearly beyond the boundaries of 
“Americanness.”  In addition to pointing fingers at supposed threats to America, HUAC also 
sought to educate the American public on how to remain vigilant against subversion by un-
American entities. HUAC produced films, articles, and radio programs to make appeals to 
Americans to support its political mission, but by the 1960s many audiences questioned the 
methods of these appeals. Throughout its history, HUAC created an extensive archive of 
dispositions, subpoenas, and propaganda, creating a large source base to draw from when 
discussing its history. Many scholarly studies have focused on HUAC’s propaganda but have 
neglected to engage how these creations affected specific communities, as the discussion below 
of historiography will show.  This work will build upon these previous analyses to study the 
effects of this elaborate propaganda machine on rural communities, using local media discourse.   
The study of propaganda seeks to find the hidden motives and reasoning behind 
messages. Propaganda may be studied in its purest form at the source, but its impact must be 
discerned by studying the farthest points of distribution of its message.  The Eastern coast of 
America was home to the centers of government, but propaganda produced in federal agencies 
had a much wider reach.  The Western coast of America was home to rapidly growing postwar 
population centers, which housed dense populations of liberals who fervently opposed HUAC’s 
message.  The American Midwest included many sparsely populated rural expanses, and so a 
study of the impact of HUAC propaganda is needed to explore the full scope of its political 
impact nationally.  Accordingly, this work focuses on the rural settings of the American Midwest 
and how HUAC propaganda was accepted or questioned in these communities.  Ames, Iowa, a 
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Midwestern college town, presents an excellent case study of residents’ reactions to the showing 
of two HUAC propaganda films in 1961.  Local anti-communists warned that Ames could be the 
next hotbed of communism, accusing Iowa State University students and even some professors 
of unpatriotic behavior in their protests against HUAC’s films and its message.  
The historiography of the American Midwest during the Cold War uses three 
methodologies: urban focus, national legislation, and studies of anti-communism.  While all 
these techniques of studying the Cold War era have their strengths, none of them properly 
capture the rural experience and how interactions occurred between urban centers and rural 
communities.  Too often, observers rely on a simple extrapolation of urban trends to rural 
settings, without proper case studies.  The lack of inclusion for rural communities in the study of 
the Cold War has created a gap in the history of America. Methodologically, I will be combining 
many of these approaches to better tell the story of the effect of Cold War tensions.  Over the 
past seventy years, the historiography has evolved to adapt to trends in historical analysis and to 
fit the narrative of American identity through its intense rivalry with communist Russia.   
The most recent method for studying the Cold War is that of studying population centers 
with large case studies and extrapolating to a wider American Cold War experience.  This 
method has a major benefit, it helps to fill gaps for source material which may no longer exist. 
Urban-focused historians such as Theodore Draper have emphasized the study of communism in 
large cities such as Chicago, Minneapolis, and Omaha.  In his 2003 edition of American 
Communism & Soviet Russia, Draper specifically focuses on instances of communist popularity 
in these cities during the Great Depression.3 While these metropolises do provide a more diverse 
 
3 Draper, Theodore, American Communism and Soviet Russia, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003). 
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supply of source material, these cities are hardly representative of the American Midwest as a 
whole. Contrary to this method, I posit that the large cities of the Midwest are the exception 
rather than the rule. Attention to small towns is essential, in order to offer a more detailed 
historical understanding of the complexity of Midwestern ideas, interactions, and concerns.  
The second approach to this historiography involves an analysis of the national 
legislature. Using this method, historians such as David Caute and Landon Storrs have created 
narratives which center around the effect of legislative action on the state and national level to 
convey public sentiment.  In Caute’s landmark 1978 work entitled, The Great Fear: The Anti-
Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower, he discusses the limiting of communist 
activity via legislative action.  While the Midwest is not a focus of Caute’s work, it does appear 
through his discussion of support for legislation and presidential candidates.4  The discussion of 
Midwestern sentiment here presents as passive participation and individual action, rather than 
direct agency, as representing a truly unique demographic.  Storrs in his book, The Second Red 
Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left, uses a similar method to Caute but includes direct 
agency for Midwestern rural sentiment.  Storrs’ brief discussion of the Midwest comes in the 
form of Native American and minority support for liberalism and is more anecdotal in passing, 
rather than a true case study.5  Nevertheless, his work ultimately falls short of explaining how 
small Midwestern communities interacted with urban centers in this history.  
The oldest approach in studying the Cold War is to address the Midwest as a victim of 
national anti-communist institutions and movements such as McCarthyism, the House 
 
4 Caute, David, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1978), 41-45. 
5 Storrs, Landon, The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2013), 16-50. 
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Committee on Un-American Activities, and the John Birch Society. Early Cold War historians 
such as James Burnham and Robert Carr were discussing the HUAC and Joseph McCarthy while 
they were each still extant.  Burnham, who wrote his work Web of Subversion in 1954, discussed 
the possibility of a large-scale subversion of the United States government. Burnham’s book was 
written in the wake of Joseph McCarthy’s rabblerousing in the Senate, and it encapsulated the 
American obsession with subversion and suggested that it was not a passing fad propagated by 
one man. Rather, Burnham concluded, the hysteria surrounding subversion was a cultural 
defense mechanism to enforce conformity.  Burnham focused on a case study of people accused 
of subversion and used an analysis of Stalinist accusatory practices in the U.S.S.R. to shed light 
on American hysteria.  Burnham even quoted Stalin in his introduction to explain the source of 
American hysteria, “From a communist point of view, in fact, open communist activities are 
primarily an auxiliary and front for an underground.”6  Recently this comparative study of the 
Cold War has blossomed under Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Robert Gellately, both of whom have 
worked to provide a more diverse view of the hysteria and accusatory practices which plagued 
both the United States as well as the U.S.S.R.  Although the work of these historians is important 
in the historiography of the Cold War as a whole, this project will be focusing solely upon the 
rural American experience and thus will not be directly interacting with their works.   
Other historians have focused specifically on the creation of HUAC and the legality of its 
processes, such as the work of law professor Robert Carr.  By studying the early years of HUAC, 
Carr set the groundwork for a discussion of where national security began and personal liberty 
 
6 Burnham, James, The Web of Subversion: Underground Networks in the U.S. Government (New York: The John 
Day Company, 1954), 16. 
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ended.7 Carr’s work, published in 1952, precede the hysteria of Joseph McCarthy and appeared 
before the mass criticism aimed at academia in the late 1950’s.  Carr provides a unique analysis 
of HUAC with fewer personal biases than at least some later McCarthy-era works.  Given that 
HUAC particularly targeted the political beliefs and practices of academia, many professors and 
academics proved especially critical of its actions. For example, Walter Goodman’s 1969 book 
The Committee: The extraordinary career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
condemned the committee’s actions at every turn.  
From the beginning, HUAC’s prime directive was to root out subversion, and these 
politicians cast a wide net. Subversion was defined by historian Powell Davies in 1953 as 
“anything that attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our 
Constitution.”8  Davies’ definition pointed out that subversion did not require a direct action 
against the government of the United States itself, but instead, some type of assault against 
American ideas of government. In this definition, the ideas of government were protected rather 
than the government itself, meaning that the HUAC had little interest in rooting out physical 
threats. Instead, its battle was one of ideology, aimed at creating a consensus of fear. Davies 
wrote his work near the height of Cold War tensions, yet he suggested a more passive strategy 
against communism. He stated, “Communism is the enemy. But we cannot defeat it by 
remaining as we are. We cannot subdue it by force of arms… We must wear it down…. Our 
truth must defeat its falsehoods, our liberty its servitude, our justice its oppressions, our 
compassion its cruelties, our faith its cynicism, our humanity its degradations and debasement”9   
 
7 Carr, Robert, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1952), 1-35. 
8 Davies, Powell, The Urge to Persecute, 146. 
9 Ibid, 212. 
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From this passage Davies provided a very clear plan for the United States to overcome 
communism abroad and at home. In doing this he had ultimately provided an appeal to HUAC 
supporters to search for the truth, not give into hysteria and work towards improving American 
values. Davies believed that if all these goals could be met, then a better strategy for combatting 
communism would arise. In the historiography of the Cold War, Davies was one of many 
scholars who wrote about HUAC tactics but the idea that consumed Davies was one of bias.  
Davies approached his work with a vision of victory of capitalism over communism and started 
from a point of view that communism was the great enemy and that the threat to American 
society was very real.  
While the works of Davies, Carr, Storrs and Caute provide the groundwork for this 
project, this research represents a local study of the impact of anti-communism and a breakdown 
of why HUAC propaganda was so controversial. To start by briefly examining the history of 
HUAC, the ideology supporting pseudo-judicial institutions like HUAC proved essential to 
sustaining long-term existence. In the case of HUAC, its creation in 1936 was originally meant 
to be temporary. Two years later, when the committee was fully organized, it was clear that 
Martin Dies, the chairman of the committee, had little intention of allowing the committee to be 
temporary. The committee even received permanent resources in the form of personnel from the 
justice department, institutionalizing its more sustained intention.10 After the end of World War 
II in 1945, the committee transitioned to what was known as the standing committee, and it 
existed as the HUAC until its rebranding into the House Internal Security Committee in 1969. 
The committee would be dissolved altogether in 1975, ending its near forty-year career.  
 
10 Goodman, Walter, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc, 1969), 24-25.  
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The Cold War was not the beginning of organized anti-communism in the United States, 
given that perceptions of Communist threat had even been a concern of American officials after 
the Russian Revolution of 1917. The post-World War I era of anxiety is when the United States 
began its anti-communist doctrine. Yet even so, the Republican victor of the 1920 election, 
Warren G. Harding was skeptical about the need for intense anti-communism campaigns, 
commenting, “Too much has been said about Bolshevism in America.”11 Often referred to as the 
“first red scare”, the era from the Russian revolution until the beginning of World War II was a 
defining moment for anti-communist political sentiment.  Tensions ran high, as the Russian 
revolution was fresh on American minds. In 1938, the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
addressed many of these growing concerns in a new policy of requiring foreign political agents 
to register publicly. That approach, however, did not offer any means to fight the perceived 
threat of home-grown communists, nor did it pertain to any American citizens that those 
lobbyists had influenced.  The Smith Act, passed in 1940, attached criminal consequences to 
Communist sympathy, criminalizing any political activity whose platform actively attempted to 
abolish the American government.12   The Smith Act drove many revolutionary communists and 
their allies underground, leading HUAC and other observers to fear that communists had shifted 
to present themselves as socialists, new dealers and traditional progressives. The resulting 
sentiment meant that in anti-Communist circles, no one on the political left was above 
suspicion.13 
 
11 Ceplair, Larry, Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America: A Critical History (Santa Barbara: Prauger, 
2011), 22. 




Following World War II, earlier fears of communism invigorated these tensions with the 
rising Cold War rivalry between the global superpowers, often depicted as the ultimate battle of 
ideologies. High-profile spokesmen such as J. Edgar Hoover trumpeted the necessity of guarding 
the political purity of Americans, especially the younger generations. In his 1960 book, 
Communist Target: Youth, Communist Infiltration and Agitation Tactics, Hoover warned that 
American youth were impressionable, vulnerable to manipulation.  This “brainwashing” was 
supposedly happening within the university setting, as leftist teachers encouraged students to 
embrace subversive goals and “think freely”. Hoover portrayed college students as threats, but 
not by their own intent.14 What is assumed in this case is that citizens were born American, but 
communists were made. The judicial backing of the F.B.I. for HUAC played right into 
conservative fears of subversion by leftists. HUAC had long feared academia as representing a 
hotbed of leftist thought, but after Hoover’s warning, the committee reinvigorated its review of 








14 Hoover, John E, Communist Target: Youth: Communist Infiltration and Agitation Tactics, 1960. 
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CHAPTER 3. CAMPUS TENSION AND HUAC’S FILM CAMPAIGN 
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, many colleges and universities were targeted 
as supposed sources of liberal and many times communist thought.  In this era, individual 
professors faced harsh consequences for leaning too far to the political left, either in true belief 
or in matters of research.  Faculty of universities around the nation were targeted, and 126 
professors were brought up on individual charges from their universities.15 The American public 
was not only aware of this fact but had begun a nail-biting craze of suspicion.  Professors around 
the nation turned to the American Association of University Professors or AAUP for support. 
They found AAUP’s support lacking and, in many cases, not holding up its tenet of defending 
free academic discourse and political belief among professors. One faculty member of UCLA, 
John Caughey, found this out the hard way when he refused to sign a loyalty oath and was 
terminated from his position in 1956.  In response, the AAUP offered him financial support, to 
which Caughey observed “that it is analogous to coping with the problem of industrial accidents 
by raising money to cover hospital costs.”16  It is clear that many professors had nowhere to turn; 
defending oneself was akin to guilt, and lack of defense meant that a person’s life could be torn 
asunder.  By 1960, HUAC had laid the groundwork for asserting that universities and youth 
organizations were prime targets for insurrection.17  
On May 12, 1960, the HUAC set up a council of investigation to ascertain the extent of 
communist activity in Berkeley, California.  After the group sent out subpoenas for testimony, an 
 
15 Schrecker, Ellen, No Ivory Tower (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 97-109. 
16 Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 314-315. 
17 Lewis, Lionel, Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1988), 7-26. 
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anonymous source sent a call out for the students of the University of California to come to 
Berkeley’s city hall to protest. The call was answered by over a thousand students, a few hundred 
of whom were allowed inside the already packed hearing room and the surrounding halls, while 
the rest waited outside.  As the subpoenaed communists came to testify, they used their time to 
make statements that inflamed many listening students.18  Protests eventually turned into a riot, 
as students mobbed police who were trying to restore order. The police responded by turning fire 
hoses on the students who refused to leave, dragging many of them one by one down the stone 
stairs of the city hall.19  In J. Edgar Hoover’s perception, those students had been manipulated by 
a few agitators, taken advantage of, by speakers seeking to meet the goals of communist 
infiltration.20 
In 1960, the House Un-American Activities Committee commissioned the creation of two 
films that could be shown to general audiences around the country and thus, the filmmakers 
hoped, to steer public opinion in places such as Iowa.  The first of these films, titled Communism 
on the Map, was meant for community education and warned about the potential spread of 
communism and socialism both overseas and within the United States. This film was intended as 
an introduction to foster a public discussion on international communism and to build the belief 
that capitalism was besieged on all fronts. 
The second film, Operation Abolition, gave HUAC’s perspective on the 1960 Berkeley, 
California student riots.  The film showed local educators and political leaders whom HUAC had 
 
18 Operation Abolition, directed by Fulton Lewis III, written by John E. Hoover, accessed February 15, 2018, 
https://archive.org/details/HUAC-Operation-Abolition-Film 
19 Operation Abolition. 
20 Hoover, John E, Communist Target: Youth, 1960.  
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subpoenaed to give testimony on their involvement with any known communist organizations. 
Among those subpoenaed was Archie Brown, second in command of the California Communist 
Party.  Brown appeared on film acting extremely uncooperative and had to be removed from the 
courtroom three times, twice for allegedly inciting riots and once for being in contempt of the 
committee.  Brown’s behavior was not unusual for witnesses called before HUAC, who typically 
refused to answer questions. Brown instead tried to use his time to read into the record a 
prepared statement. As the committee ordered him to answer specific questions, Brown simply 
kept re-reading his statement, repeatedly citing his First and Fifth Amendment rights.  Brown 
demanded that the committee “open up the doors” and let protestors in to see what their 
government was doing.  Many students present at the town hall outside the committee room 
responded with verbal attacks against the police present.  HUAC’s film Operation Abolition 
focused on that student disorder to validate concerns voiced by FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, 
earlier in 1960.  Hoover had stated that the American public itself was an unlikely target for 
subversion, but that communists could well target impressionable students across the nation.21  
Hoover warned parents and community members that their friends and family could be swept up 
in a communist plot. HUAC similarly perpetuated fears about the rabblerousing of young people. 
As shown in Operation Abolition, Archie Brown responded to very few questions during his 
Berkeley interrogation, but one that he did clearly answer was the name of his hometown. When 
the chairman asked where he was from, Archie Brown proudly stated that he was born and raised 
in Sioux City, Iowa.22  This scene in Operation Abolition undoubtedly grabbed attention of many 
viewers when this film was shown on the Iowa State University campus.  It suggested that 
 
21 Hoover, John E. Communist Target: Youth. 
22 Operation Abolition.  
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alleged communist agitators were not a thousand miles away, but within their own state, giving 
subversion a homegrown link.  An article in the Des Moines register on September 20 of 1961 
describes that, “two air force officers were removed from their jobs and were reprimanded for 
violating orders by showing the film.”23      
Both Communism on the Map and Operation Abolition set out to intensify fear of 
communism and increase vigilance against possible threats among the American public. Both 
films were for community education, and Operation Abolition in particular was extensively used 
in far-right leaning anti-communist seminars.24  Universities were prime targets for these 
seminars, since critics believed that faculty and students usually landed on the liberal side of the 
political spectrum. In 1961, about 15 to 17 million people viewed Operation Abolition at 
schools, libraries, and local theaters.25  
The HUAC’s Operation Abolition emphasized the threat of communist insurrection. Such 
warnings from HUAC were not altogether new, but what changed was how fear was being used. 
The film presented un-American activities as an ongoing threat, citing the student riots at the 
University of California at Berkeley. The target of HUAC propaganda had always been to 
denounce communists, but with this film, the committee set the parameters of Americanness 
specifically as revolving around support or disdain for the committee itself. Ultimately, the film 
intended to create a sense of pride for HUAC’s supporters, via the thought process that if 
communists opposed it, then its investigations must be on the right track.  HUAC aimed for 
 
23 Doak, “2 Punished for Showing of ‘Operation Abolition’,” Des Moines Register, September 20, 1961.  
24 Bogle, Lori, The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War, (College Station, Texas A&M 
University Press, 2004), 133-169. 
25 Harrison, Joshua, “Operation Correction: The Rhetorical Battle Sparked by Film Footage of the May 1960 
Student Protest at San Francisco’s City Hall,” American Communist History, vol 12, no.2 (2013), 137-40. 
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Operation Abolition to reinforce its political message of vigilance, but the movie spurred 
national debates over HUAC’s methods, its constitutionality, and the accuracy and ethics of the 
film itself.   
In Ames, Iowa, following showings of these HUAC films, these debates became 
encapsulated in exchanges via campus newspapers and other local media. Sparks of hysteria flew 
between writers to the Iowa State Daily, as Iowans considered the imagined threat of societal 
upheaval.  The two sides in this debate were the ideas of “positive Americanism” and anti-
communism. While parties in the Iowa discussion typically agreed that communism was an 
unacceptable political ideology, they disagreed about how to express these baseline beliefs.  
Fervent anti-communists called for the tough pursuit of known communists as well as an 
aggressive investigation of possible subversives.   But other observers worried about rabble-
rousing and questioned whether subversion really presented such widespread danger; they 
believed that persecution and blacklisting might do more harm than good and, in some cases, 
push innocent non-communists to extremes.  
Prominent national political figures of the era, such as F.B.I. director J. Edgar Hoover, 
pressed for regarding communist subversion as a very real danger. Hoover’s 1958 book Masters 
of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It described the Soviet run 
American Communist Party as posing a hidden but constant threat.  By his logic, Americans’ 
sense of security was only an illusion, meaning that any visible hints of subversion must be dealt 
with swiftly and harshly, to uncover the hidden tendrils beneath the surface. Hoover categorized 
the threat as coming from outside of American society, and thus concluded that to be part of this 
subversion was to surrender your identity as an American.  Hoover directly stated that 
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“Communists are not Americans” and thus that anyone who was a communist thereby ceases to 
be an American.26   
Not everyone was swayed by Hoover’s words, even in the depths of the Cold War 
environment. For instance, the concept of “positive Americanism” presented in 1960 by Donald 
G. Paterson, professor of psychology at the University of Minnesota, created an alternative that 
offered a more restrained approach to communism.27 Paterson argued that communists were not 
as prevalent in U.S. society as Hoover or the HUAC would have people believe; he suggested 
that instead of witch hunting, Americans should focus on creating an environment for American 
values to thrive.28  Paterson suggested that as long as citizens were content, then they would be 
unwilling to tear down American capitalism by joining communist agitators.  His view aimed to 
foster a less paranoid, more positive American identity, while warning that the anti-communist 
crusade was doing more damage than good. That perspective offered an alternate vision of what 
it meant to be an American, resting on a trust in American values and a faith that capitalism 
would ultimately outlast its ideological rival anyway. Such differing opinions, about how much 
to fear the threat of subversion and how to respond, intensified discussion amongst an already 
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CHAPTER 4. HUAC FILM SCREENINGS AND ENSUING DEBATE IN AMES, IOWA  
On March 17, 1961, Communism on the Map was shown at the journalism building on 
the Iowa State University campus.  The film contained descriptions of socialism and 
communism, in which they were equated to each other, implying that the post-World War II 
European continent was consumed by communism.29  Overall, the theme emphasized the risk of 
spreading international communism and depicted America as the bastion of capitalism but 
surrounded on all fronts, with Cuba to the South, Europe to the East, and Russia and China to the 
West.  Students and reporters from the Iowa State Daily attended the film showing, as did some 
community members and college faculty, including historian Elbert Smith and economist Harold 
Davey.  These two faculty allegedly dominated the post-film discussion time with criticisms of 
the film’s viewpoint. According to reports from one attendee, Smith and Davies even went so far 
as to shut down a student from Lebanon who argued for the validity of the film’s depiction of the 
overseas popularity of alternatives to capitalism.30  
Ames residents responded to the film by writing letters to the Iowa State University 
paper, which either condemned the film or supported its release. In particular, the letters opened 
a public disagreement between two Iowa State University students, Jack Kartel and Stephen 
Ryan.  On one hand, Kartel was one of the most outspoken critics of Communism on the Map 
while on the other hand Ryan wrote in support of the film. On March 24, 1961, Kartel wrote, “I 
was shocked because I found that even college-educated, American men and women, wrapped in 
the protective armor of the flag, can be swayed by mass media so unashamedly emotional in 
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nature that it makes me ill to admit that I sat through the whole showing.”31  Kartel then 
concluded, “Perhaps apathy towards such “education” is after all the best course of action. It is 
one I will take in the future.”32 While Kartel declared that he was so fed up with the political 
nature of the film that he planned to remove himself from the entire debate, some other Midwest 
college students were also apparently moving toward apathy. Just a month after Kartel’s 
declaration of apathy, on April 13, 1961 the Iowa State Daily published an article discussing 
student interest and views on the John Birch Society on the Kansas State University campus. The 
JBS had fostered a longstanding reputation of being extremist and even subversive in its support 
for anti-communism and HUAC. The poll takers at Kansas State University were surprised by 
students’ responses.  Specifically, the poll moderators were disturbed by the lack of student 
political concern, and they wrote, “No one that we have questioned seems to have any definite 
opinions formed in favor or against the supposedly anti-communist organization.” 33  The article 
points out that the tactics of the JBS were “Militantly anti-communist” and “borrowed the 
communist technique of setting up front groups.”34 What had concerned the poll takers in this 
instance was the apathy of young Americans to anti-communism in general and that it showed a 
failing of American identity.  
While Kartel had declared that the film’s patriotic hard-sell made him feel “ill,” fellow 
ISU student Stephen Ryan wrote in support of HUAC and the anti-communist agenda.  Ryan 
declared that “I have no particular ax to grind except the ax which every United States citizen 
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should and must grind sooner or later the affirmation of our American heritage and the 
denunciation of a communist future.”35  Ryan represented communism as an absolute enemy for 
Americans to combat as a rite of passage into American identity; to be American, Ryan believed, 
one must be anti-communist. Ryan further asserted that, “To me, communism vs. democracy is 
an area where there are only blacks and whites; no grays. I have a feeling that people who speak 
of this open-mindedness and objectivity generally have nearly three strikes against democracy at 
the onset of any discussion comparing communism and democracy.”36  Ryan’s argument 
effectively tried to label critics of the film and of HUAC as Un-American. 
The showing of Communism on the Map was just the first component of the propaganda 
campaign about to hit Ames. Beyond the message of the film itself, the Ames community was 
also concerned about how that message was presented, with its implications regarding patriotism, 
debate, and dissent.  Immediately after the ISU campus showing, Communism on the Map 
became a hot topic of debate in Ames.  The film host, Arden Pulley, the local student whom the 
Iowa State Daily invited to show the film, stated, “I was under the impression that the viewers 
were concerned over communist advances and sincerely interested in the film.”37  Pulley was 
responsible for the film equipment and setting up before the showing as well as packing up after 
discussion, and he was appalled at the student behavior he witnessed. The reality of how the 
community felt was drastically at odds with Pulley’s initial beliefs about how Ames viewers 
would receive the film. To Pulley, the film was “an excellent government document which, 
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among other things, informs us that ‘every Communist communication must convey an 
orthodoxy that is revolutionarily activating message to the party and its followers. This same 
communication must convey a different, ie. Soothing, pacifying and paralyzing message to the 
opponent of communism.’ It is of little value for each of us to go looking for Communists with 
the hope of pointing our finger at them, however we must learn to become resistant to their 
efforts of conditioning and thought control.”38 Pulley worried about the world becoming 
corrupted by the counter narrative presented by communists and thus valued the message from 
HUAC as the authority on anti-communism, which he assumed had Americans’ best interests at 
heart.  
The campus debate over HUAC propaganda was not over, though. Iowa State University 
hosted two showings of HUAC’s film Operation Abolition, on April 16 and May 14, 1961, on 
campus. The initial showing on April 16 was a smaller showing, sponsored only by the Frisbie 
United Student Center, accompanied by a discussion led by history and political science 
professor Elbert Smith.  In this preliminary showing, Smith approached the film as a prime 
example of propaganda; news accounts referred to him as “providing various pieces of printed 
material pointing out the propaganda techniques used in the film.”39 While the April 16 showing 
of Operation Abolition drew a smaller crowd, Smith’s outright criticism of the film nonetheless 
attracted the attention of the community. In attendance at the film on April 16 was Patricia Bliss, 
the wife of an Ames city councilman and owner of an Ames building development company. 
After the event, Bliss expressed her skepticism of Smith’s lesson on propaganda, telling fellow 
Ames resident David Norris that “The ‘various pieces of printed material’ were indeed 
 
38 Pulley, Arden, “Must Have Committees Against Reds,” Iowa State Daily, May 5, 1961. 
39 Doak, “Operation Abolition Shown to Students,” Iowa State Daily, April 18, 1961. 
22 
 
various…supplied free of charge and there was nothing to back up HUAC’s side of the 
controversy... Some of which I believe to be supplied by a communist front.”40  By so strongly 
opposing anti-communism, Smith brought himself into the line of fire, suspected of propagating 
his anti-American and anti-patriotic beliefs to the student body. Bliss also noticed that “No 
faculty member or adult was invited or present to offer the opposite viewpoint.”41 In particular, 
the lack of additional viewpoints at the film with an audience of students and youth correlated 
with J. Edgar Hoover’s warning in Communist Target: Youth earlier that year about youthful 
susceptibility to political manipulation. In communicating with Norris, Bliss attached a copy of 
Communist Target: Youth to emphasize her concern over Smith’s demeanor. The lack of 
impartial discussion at showings of Operation Abolition, concerned Bliss, especially since the 
showings had been advertised with a promise that the film would be a platform for an unbiased 
discussion. The April 16 showing had been advertised as being a chance to partake in anti-
communism, but Bliss perceived it as becoming Elbert Smith’s platform for teaching about 
propaganda.  In her mind, the intention of the film had been corrupted, and given the attention 
drawn to the issue, a second showing was scheduled for May 14, 1961. 
Just a few days before the showing, on May 11, 1961, an editorial from the Iowa State 
Daily stated: 
No doubt viewers this Sunday will hear synopses of both sides of the argument 
during the discussion, but perhaps more fruitful observations can also be 
obtained…. Most students will probably attend the showing here with their mind 
already made up about the film. The most educational value from the showing can 
therefore be obtained not by talking about the film itself, but by projecting the 
conversation into the future. In all the controversy surrounding “Operation 
Abolition” little has been said about how to resolve the argument between 
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supporters and protestors of the film. With the aid of the panel members, perhaps 
the audience can gain some insight into how America can educate itself against 
communism without offending some of its citizens. 42  
As this quote makes clear, the Ames community already was aware of the controversial 
nature of Operation Abolition. Accordingly, the Iowa State Daily editorial writers encouraged a 
hope that the post-film discussion panel would help to curb the intensity of audience reactions.   
  Anticipation ran high for the May 14, 1961, second showing of Operation Abolition, 
which was sponsored by eleven student groups, including the YMCA, Frisbie United Student 
Fellowship, Young Republicans, Young Democrats, Interfraternity Council, and Panhellenic 
Council. Community leaders around the Ames area hoped for a chance to re-do the earlier 
discussion that critics believed Smith had hijacked. This time around the discussion was led by a 
panel comprised of Harold Davey of economics, ISU student and Interfraternity Council 
president Jack Hansen, ISU student Dick Rainford of the Young Republicans Club, and ISU 
student Tom Harkin of the Young Democrats club.43 Since this panel featured multiple leaders of 
the student body with different viewpoints, it promised to provide a more politically even-handed 
discussion of the film, as per the Iowa State Daily’s advertisements.  Davey had been a strong 
critic of HUAC when he discussed Communism on the Map earlier that year and was slated to be 
the leader of the opposition to the film. However, the organizers of the showing did not count on 
the audience being already extremely biased against HUAC and already in avid agreement with 
Davey’s critiques of the film. At the post-film discussion, some audience members began to boo 
in response to favorable comments about HUAC from student panelists and to cheer with great 
enthusiasm when Davey responded with harsh criticism.44 Will Jumper, a local professor of 
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English and Speech, later wrote that during the showing, he “laughed bitterly or gaily depending 
upon whether the distortions were vicious or merely ludicrous.”45 Those skeptical film viewers in 
Ames particularly objected to the way that Operation Abolition depicted the 1960 student 
protests of the HUAC at the University of California by blaming the unrest on communist 
agitators.46  That accusation seemed to remove all agency from the students’ actions and 
delegitimized student protests, amounting to what Will Jumper called “Pictorial Blackmail.”47   
The negative response to HUAC and its agenda shown by some campus audience 
members at the second showing of Operation Abolition seemed to further reinforce J. Edgar 
Hoover’s warning from Communist Target: Youth. Anti-communists in Ames could now see that 
the backlash from students was growing. The initial showing of Communism on the Map seemed 
to confirm that some ISU faculty were critical of HUAC and ready to voice such criticism to 
students.  The second showing of Operation Abolition seemed to confirm the anti-communists’ 
worst nightmare, that students had begun to turn against HUAC. Anti-communists in Ames 
feared that a local communist subversion movement had taken hold of the Iowa State student 
body.  Accordingly, concerned citizens responded by escalating beyond simply writing to the 
newspaper; they took matters to the university president and F.B.I., ready to become what J. 
Edgar Hoover had wanted, Americans ready for action against communism.   
Again, following the film showing, students and other Ames residents wrote to the local 
newspaper. Some correspondents, such as Jill Gaylord, wife of an Iowa State student, stressed 
the idea that in discussions surrounding Operation Abolition, a “fair balance of pro/con ideas 
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need to be presented.”48 This technique of defending HUAC argued that moderators for the post-
film discussion should have enforced a discussion where all beliefs were held in the same regard. 
Other writers warned that failure to oppose communism at every turn would only aid 
communists. Arden Pulley, a senior student at ISU declared that “We must prevent a wedge from 
separating the people from our government and the destruction of our society by the Red 
machine of abolition.”49 Pulley added that the movement to abolish HUAC was a subversive 
action by communists and indicated that HUAC should be given the benefit of the doubt.  Pulley 
regarded HUAC as purely American and suggested that people should stand with HUAC and the 
American government, rather than risking consuming communist propaganda by accident.    
But others in Ames who had attended the showing of Operation Abolition or followed the 
controversy wrote in to challenge the premise that HUAC was protecting American interests. 
With few reasons to believe that communists were behind every blade of grass, these critics only 
saw the committee as an outdated witch hunt which violated citizens’ rights. Frank Cartledge and 
David Garfinkel, both students at Iowa State University, encapsulated this feeling in their letter 
to the Iowa State Daily on May 10, 1961.  They stated that “These committees have been 
organized to protect this country from internal danger. To do so at the cost of impinging U.S. 
citizens is a poor exchange indeed, even if these committees were effective, which they are not! 
Vigilante committees have assumed namely, the power of accusation with judicial immunity.”50  
These two students were not alone, as many other Ames citizens echoed their sentiment.  
Another student, Donald Adams, stated in a letter to the campus paper, “We have just as much to 
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fear from the activities of the far right as we do from the activities of the far left.”51 Adams 
warned that Americans truly had to fear HUAC as well as communists and indeed, that the 
tactics of HUAC appeared to be not too dissimilar to those utilized by communist propaganda 
bureaus.   
Watching the HUAC film Operation Abolition and seeing or hearing about the audience 
reaction prompted others in Ames to take even more direct action beyond writing letters to local 
papers.  On June 20, 1961, Ames resident David Norris wrote what he called a community action 
report, which he sent to the president of Iowa State University, James Hilton.    As one of the 
city’s leading businessmen, Norris was particularly alarmed by the HUAC film’s depiction of 
events in another college town, Berkeley. He perceived California communist leader Archie 
Brown as having instigated student riots, adding his alarm that similar tactics were being used in 
Ames.  Norris feared that the student body of Iowa State University could be a threat to the 
institution and community if the wrong things were said by the wrong person.52 Norris wrote, 
“We are concerned about the influence of these few on some unsuspecting citizens and, even 
more important, on some unsuspecting students who are being influenced because of their 
respect for the scholastic attainment of Smith and others.”53 In his report, Norris made no actual 
accusation of communist leanings towards any one person in Ames, at ISU, or in Iowa. Instead, 
he expressed concern about community disillusionment with government institutions that had 
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been created to hunt down America’s internal enemies. In his introduction to the report, Norris 
declared:  
We are not accusing anyone of being a communist. We believe that all men, 
including ourselves, must be held accountable for our actions regardless of our 
intent when it involved the survival and freedom of others. We are concerned with 
the attitudes of a few towards anti-communism, patriotism and our traditional 
form of government, even the Congress of the United States. We do not question 
the right of any man to independent political belief; but insofar that the stand of 
any person, ourselves included, parallels the stand advocated by communists, 
militarily, economically and politically, it is of acute concern to all Americans.54   
This comment was directed towards the many students and faculty who had spoken out after the 
film to criticize HUAC and what they regarded as its unnecessary and dangerous alarmism over 
subversive activity. Norris interpreted that reaction as an unpatriotic lack of support for Anti-
communist vigilance.  Specifically, Norris complained that the professors who dominated the 
post-film discussion at ISU were biased against the HUAC and had used their authority to 
become rabble-rousers, trying to whip up anti-anti-communism among ISU students and 
community members attending the screening.55 Norris wrote, “Faculty are using their positions, 
personally and occupationally with the University to further their political ideals,” adding that 
“faculty use baseless accusations, labels and untrue statements about students, films and 
organizations to further other views.”56    
Norris’s letter specifically criticized the way several ISU professors had acted during the 
campus showing of Operation Abolition. One of Norris’ most pointed complaints was against 
Smith who had, in his eyes, instigated the entire student body. Norris complained to Hilton that 
the ISU students present jeered at comments made in favor of the film, but applauded Smith’s 
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anti-HUAC remarks.57  Norris’s observations mentioned two other ISU professors as being 
strong critics of the HUAC films, Keith Huntress of the English department and Harold Davey of 
Economics.  
Norris’s comments reflected more than just his reaction to the events immediately 
surrounding him in Ames, they reflected wider national events. The early 1960s represented an 
extremely tense environment of Cold War confrontation. In April of 1961, President John F. 
Kennedy announced the failure of hostile action against communists in Cuba.  The Bay of Pigs, 
as the episode became known, further escalated ongoing tensions between communist nations 
and capitalist nations.  The war of ideology had taken a violent turn with this project to arm and 
fund Cuban nationalists. Their goal was to retake the island nation from the newly communist 
dictatorship and return the Atlantic and Caribbean as a barrier between communist bases and the 
United States.  The speech that President Kennedy made on April 20, 1961, addressed not only 
the failure at hand but also the nature of the war to come against communism.  The war Kennedy 
presented was one where “it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner 
of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments.  The armies are 
there, and in large number.  The nuclear armaments are there.  But they serve primarily as the 
shield behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other tactics steadily advance, picking 
off vulnerable areas one by one in situations which do not permit our own armed intervention.”58  
Kennedy’s message thus presented an image of future wars being fought with subversion and 
cloak and dagger, words that hit home for many American citizens. In his comments to ISU 
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president James Hilton, Norris quoted Kennedy’s April 20th speech, using it as rationale for 
bringing his concerns forward.  Norris believed that Kennedy was calling citizens into action 
against the veiled threats of communist subversion. In a footnote to his letter, Norris escalated 
his concerns by informing Hilton that “he had also forwarded his letter to special agent Thomas 
Gearity of the FBI office in Omaha, Nebraska.”59  
Charges of subversion, association with communists, or sympathy for communism had 
proved disastrous for many other Americans during the Cold War. A number lost their jobs, 
several committed suicide. But at ISU, despite the seriousness of the accusations of a lack of 
patriotism leveled against professors such as Norris and Bliss and Smith, it does not appear that 
these faculty members involved with the incident suffered any serious official repercussions. 
There were apparently no moves to fire or blacklist any of those involved. Indeed, one year later, 
the ISU yearbook, the 1962 BOMB, featured a photograph of Smith entertaining other faculty at 
his home. His ongoing and public role in the university faculty’s social life suggests that those 
charges did not even result in his being socially shunned. 
The growth of Iowa State and its official change from collegiate status to university status 
could have been a major reason for Smith’s retention on staff.  Iowa State University’s student 
population was growing rapidly; from 1953 until 1965, the student population almost doubled in 
size, from 7,800 to 12,400.60  What this meant was that Iowa State University faculty and staff 
were in a transitionary mode of thinking.  Historian Lionel Lewis has suggested that unlike large 
campuses subject to intense public scrutiny over political matters, smaller and medium sized 
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schools had more leeway to give the individual the benefit of the doubt. Lewis indicates that 
many small colleges chose to handle controversial situations internally, usually suggesting that 
the accused go under review or attend meetings of rotary clubs, where local authorities could 
keep an eye on the person in question.61  Lewis finds that even university administrations had a 
role in the accusation process.  HUAC had established its purview in 1959 with the Supreme 
Court case Barenblatt v. United States, where the court ruled five to four that the first 
amendment did not protect from congressional inquiries.62  In similar fashion, historian Ellen 
Schrecker writes, in cases where charges were taken seriously enough to be reported to the legal 
authorities, the results were devastating; accused professors were usually refused tenure based on 
accusation alone.63  For example, in 1949, Professor Robert Hodes was given tenure at Tulane 
Medical School in New Orleans, but after allegations of communist sympathy were brought 
against him in 1952, he was quietly dismissed before evidence or trial.64 Dismissal for refusal to 
cooperate with authorities, such as HUAC, carried more serious consequences for others. 
Schrecker also describes in vivid detail the case of Chandler Davis, a professor at the University 
of Michigan, who was found to be in contempt of Congress in 1959.  Davis refused to answer 
HUAC’s direct inquiries on the grounds of the first amendment and faced jail time for refusal to 
cooperate with an official inquiry into matters which threatened the American way.65 Schrecker 
provides context to the situation in Ames, where Ames students were booing and laughing at 
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HUAC’s message  just two years after Davis was imprisoned for non-compliance with HUAC 
and summarily fired from his teaching position.  
None of the national uproar or disruption happened in Ames. Indeed, by 1961, some of 
the worst tensions in academic circles over subversion charges had eased. By the early 1960s, 
Schrecker notes, blacklists had been relaxed, partly to accommodate a shortage in qualified 
faculty as universities and colleges across the U.S. expanded.66 Hilton’s leniency towards Smith 
undoubtedly represented a very difficult decision. On one hand, Smith potentially posed a 
liability to Iowa State University’s reputation, both nationally and locally, especially after critics 
made their accusations public. On the other hand, Hilton was pushing for expansion of ISU 
during this time, which suggested a need for retention of qualified, established professors.  
Smith clearly did not become an outcast. Indeed, just one year after the controversy over 
his role in the HUAC screenings at ISU, Smith mounted a run for the U.S. Senate.67 Smith lost 
his race, but during the campaign, media accounts praised him as a man who was “on the go all 
of the time” and always receiving a “fine reception.”68 Again, this evidence suggests that Smith 
faced little to no social repercussions for his actions at the showings of Communism on the Map 
and Operation Abolition. Fears about anti-communism in Iowa were apparently insufficient to 
cripple Smith’s campaign in 1962.  Despite Smith’s loss in the Senate election of 1962, he 
carried significant backing from public figures such as John F. Kennedy, who endorsed Smith’s 
campaign.      
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Again, the small scale of the Iowa press community may have made a difference in the 
whole controversy. Rather than passively absorbing news reports coming from large urban 
centers, Iowans read accounts of local events and then wrote back to the editor to voice their 
opinions.  By 1960, Iowans had been thoroughly exposed to earlier Cold War charges of 
subversion, and wide-scale propaganda that defined communists as anathema to proper 
Americans. The beliefs and alignments that could put someone under suspicion of being a 
communist included opposition to religion, opposition to American policies foreign and abroad, 
an identity with former progressives, and active members of worker unions.  The idea behind 
anti-communist education was to provide a glimpse into the chaotic potential that communism 
could have on capitalism. Education about communism was duly meant to reinforce the stigma 
against all of those who could be allied to the communist cause.  Intrinsically, this education 
emphasized the most extreme and terrifying aspects of a communist take-over. But literature was 
not the only form of anti-communist education during this period. Red scare reenactments put on 
by local American Legion posts throughout the late 1940s and 1950s brought these ideas of 
hysteria off the page into a pretend reality for many Americans. As historian Richard Fried 
discusses, in May, 1950, members of the local American Legion outpost in Mosinee, Wisconsin 
dressed up as commissars and terrorized Mosinee with dramatized visualization as to what would 
happen if communists took over.69 The aim was to scare people in a whole new way.  Rather 
than reading or hearing secondhand reports of communist riots or trials, people found those 
mock communists knocking on their doors.  Churches were shut down; fake military parades 
were staged, and the mayor was “executed” by firing squad.  As ridiculous as it sounds, this 
 




pageantry of communist became a very popular form of community education and even 
entertainment. The press described the event in Mosinee in glee, suggesting a fair-like 
atmosphere of drama and comedy. Reporters across the entire state flocked to Mosinee in droves.  
It is no surprise that such an event would occur in Senator McCarthy’s home state.  Within 
months, the North Western Iowa town of Hartley staged a similar day-long anti-communist 
pageant.  Significantly, the initial reaction of some residents to this kind of corporeal Anti-
communist propaganda was hostile, and many Iowans rejected the idea altogether.  Fried writes, 
“In one case one homemaker threatened to sic her dog on any “communist” who tried to enter 
her home”.70 No newspapers visited, no reporters flocked into town, some people even left on 
“Fishing trips”. One Hartley citizen even went so far as to say, “They know communism is 
bad… when you play with something that is bad, somebody’s going to get hurt.”71  Iowans 
turned their noses up at mock revolutions; some clearly felt insulted by directed, inconvenient 
propaganda shows. In reacting to the HUAC films, many Ames residents mentioned this earlier 
education on communism, and some even argued for stepping up the coverage warning about the 
danger to American well-being.72  In other words, Iowa residents were vitally aware of earlier 
education campaigns regarding the supposed danger of communism, but few could agree on 
what were the proper messages or who should be educating whom.  
  To some Americans, HUAC seemed like a well-suited institution to handle the 
education of the American public, while others whole-heartedly disagreed. HUAC’s supporters 
claimed that it was vital to back the anti-communist campaign as a necessary precaution of the 
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times, a defensive precaution to root out potential communist plots. Ames resident [no comma, 
and give his full first name - if it’s not in his letter, use other research to find it out. Not a 
student?]  D. Erlandson expressed his opinion in writing to the Iowa State Daily on May 2, 1961, 
saying, “This attitude that so many seem to have these days, when it comes to the exposure of 
communism, sure is very disturbing to us who know, at least, some of the facts concerning the 
insidious tactics of the communists. More and more this reveals the great need for anti-
communist committees to help smoke out the many Benedict Arnolds in every avenue of our free 
land.” 73  To supporters of HUAC like Erlandson, the endless critiques presented by others was 
yet more evidence that the committee should exist.  In other words, Erlandson accepted the self-
affirming thought process that HUAC sought to instill in the public, the idea that any criticism of 
HUAC was yet more proof of the necessity of HUAC. Similarly, ISU student Arden Pulley 
wrote, “Are we going to spend more time degrading the methods others use which we do not 
agree with than we do stopping a common enemy?”74 The supporters of HUAC saw any attack 
on the committee as a direct attack on the American way of life and feared that even partly 
justified critiques only helped the communists.    
On the other hand, the critics of the committee regarded HUAC’s actions, taken in the 
name of American security, as a gross abuse of power. In their eyes, every time the committee 
abused its power, it inherently undercut its own validity. Harold A Borchers, commented on 
HUAC tactics as enforcing the idea that communism was the great enemy at the cost of 
American freedom and values.  In his article on March 17, 1961 Borchers commented that 
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“Maybe we had better take a closer look at ourselves in the U.S. The map in the film made it 
look like we are the ones behind the Iron Curtain. Maybe we are a little slow in getting caught up 
with the times.”75 This comment encapsulates Borchers’ mood throughout his article and depicts 
a reversal of HUAC’s message of communist oppression. Ames resident Bob Bartley wrote in 
the Iowa State Daily that he felt that “the real purpose of these films was not so much educating 
the public against Soviet communism as the advancement of certain ultra-right-wing domestic 
policies in the United States.”76 In addition to his outright critique of HUAC, Bartley also 
provided the following four assessments, based upon what he witnessed at showings of 
Communism on the Map: 
1. It would explain the “writing-off” of such allies as Great Britain and Canada. If one is 
sincerely interested in stopping communism, he must necessarily advocate maximum 
use of our allies. If he is interested in promoting neo-isolationism, he will belittle 
them. 
2. Similarly, it would explain the constant equation of socialism and communism. If one 
is sincerely interested in stopping communism, he will ally himself with many 
socialists… If he is interested in stopping all government attempts to promote welfare 
of its citizens, he will brand such attempts as “socialistic” and equate this with 
communism. 
3. It would explain the emphasis on the internal communist threat. If one is sincerely 
interested in stopping communism, he would realize that while an internal threat does 
exist, no communist coup, except in Russia itself, has ever been successful without 
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prior conquest by armed troops. If he is interested in undermining our faith in our 
central government, he will charge that it is leading us towards communism. 
4. It would explain Communism on the Map’s proposals for fighting communism. If one 
is sincerely interested in stopping communism. He would realize that our central 
government is our most potent anti-communist weapon. If he is interested in 
subverting the central government. He will make the fantastic proposal of fighting 
communism by enervating Washington.77  
Bartley in sum asserted that the rhetoric of HUAC propaganda isolated Americans from 
their allies across the world, that it equated socialism and communism, effectively merging the 
political left into a target for the political right to attack.  Bartley emphasized the problematic 
nature of a focus on subversion rather than a direct threat, while rejecting the idea that 
ideological conflict has gone underground.  In fact, in his last point he entrusted the true 
protection of the American way of life to the central government, seeing all of the many checks 
and balances present in the American political system as the best and only defense against 
internal strife.  Bartley aimed at combating fearmongering by trusting in the inherent strength of 
democracy; his letter did not describe communism in a positive light or even question its 
definition as America’s ideological adversary.    
While the critique of HUAC tactics from both Borchers and Bartley have differing 
approaches they also carry the same message, that HUAC’s motives were not to prevent foreign 
incursion of communism but rather to push a political agenda propagated upon the backbone of 
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hysteria. Other critics did not see the committee as inherently bad, but worried that its polarizing 
effect resulted in creating sympathy for the accused, rather than condemnation.   
Iowans sometimes hesitated to endorse an all-out pursuit of suspected subversion. In 
April, 1961, the Iowa State legislature overturned a motion to create its own committee on 
education about communism.78  While the reasons behind the bill failing are unclear, the initial 
bill specified that this planned committee would “have no power to investigate, as does the 
Congressional committee; and would serve to inform the public of the dangers of 
communism.”79 The intention was to mirror HUAC in structure and purpose, but to be more 
focused upon the situation of Iowa and serve its citizens.    
Politics in Iowa in 1961 were a polarized environment, but discussions were not 
unreasonable.  Many anti-communist supporters were eager to show films that prompted 
discussion but not outrage. Iowa State Student, Arden Pulley told the Iowa State Daily, “I would 
like to say that even though I have shown the film strip, I am most eager to show something 
better if anyone will bring it forth. Hopefully this will be acceptable to the socialists and 
moderate leftists.”80 Neither the pro-HUAC nor the anti-HUAC side wanted to be denied a voice, 
but the stakes of their disagreement sometimes masked this cordial attitude of debate.   Some 
Ames residents wrote letters to the editor that essentially supported the right for the other side to 
voice their views, as long as both could be heard. In a letter to the Ames Daily Tribune, ISU 
geology student Sharon Curry complained that “I was rather alarmed at Sunday night’s showing 
of the film Operation Abolition. The notes that the panel had seemed adequately provided with 
 
78 Doak, “Education on Communism No Job for Committee,” Iowa State Daily, April 28, 1961.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Pulley, Arden, “Film Promotor Asks Unification Against Enemy,” Iowa State Daily, May 13, 1961. 
38 
 
arguments against the film, but not with the contradictions to these arguments.”81  Curry had 
expected to hear a level headed discourse over the merits of Operation Abolition but she was 
appalled at the turn of the discussion.  She continued, “To discover the possible reason for this 
bias, I obtained one of the packets of information which was given to each panelist to study in 
preparation for the discussion. The packet furnished was entitled ‘A packet of resources on 
Operation Abolition’ put out by the Council for Christian Social Action, United Church of 
Christ.  It contained six pamphlets and articles attacking the film and HUAC in addition to J. 
Edgar Hoover’s report “Communist Target-Youth” …. Six additional publications against the 
film (but none in favor of it) had been added to the original packet. No material specifically 
favoring the film was provided to the panelists, although there are several readily available 
government documents contradicting the objections to the film.” 82 Sharon Curry concluded that 
the panelists who were supposed to be impartial moderators of discussion had been primed to 
push discussion in favor of protesters, thus creating an atmosphere ripe for polarization of the 
crowd. In perceptions of the panel as biased against HUAC, supporters of HUAC saw the 
evidence of their worst fears and protestors saw validation of their outrage. These events 
aggravated already deep ideological differences between viewers and created an aura of 
suspicion and doubt. HUAC’s supporters saw this backlash against HUAC as a confirmation of 
the validity of the film, while protesters saw the steadfast support of HUAC as systematic 
oppression of American freedom.  The stakes were high; accusations of extremism and 
denunciations of HUAC’s conservative support base began to surface, as protesters against 
HUAC felt validated and emboldened by the post-film criticism of the anti-communist hunt. 
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Political ideology was at the center of these accusations and denunciations.  Among other 
things, the HUAC’s long time association with politically conservative groups such as the John 
Birch Society (JBS) had initially helped to build its support base.  The JBS gained a reputation 
for militant anti-communism throughout the 1940’s and 1950’s, but by 1960 its direction was 
open to challenge. A May 12, 1961 Iowa State Daily article by student Ken Cargill accused the 
JBS of teaming up with HUAC in producing the film and even attempted to link the film’s 
narration directly to the JBS.83  Similar charges had been leveled nationwide; critics accused the 
HUAC of packing its film showings with JBS supporters to give itself legitimacy. But in Ames, 
supporters of the film were quick to react and blamed Cargill for making “a rather clumsy effort 
to discredit the film… [in which] Cargill had put inferences before fact.”84   In this climate, the 
JBS itself became newly controversial in Ames; Ames resident E. LaGrande Hobbs thought 
association with the JBS so taboo that he ended his letter to the Iowa State Daily by emphasizing 
that ”In order to avoid any insinuations as to membership in the John Birch Society, I would like 
to state that I am not a member of that society or any similar society.”85  
So how did student bodies across the nation go from apparent apathy towards the JBS 
and anti-communism to consistently debating their merits? The shift in tone can be attributed to 
two factors: reception of anti-communist propaganda and confirmation bias of anti-communists.   
At Iowa State University, at least some students had become extremely distrusting of the JBS, 
and the main catalyst for this reaction was the consumption of HUAC films.  Both Communism 
on the Map and Operation Abolition had been viewed and discussed by Iowa State students.  By 
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the end of the showings in the spring of 1961, the Iowa State University campus was a 
battleground of ideology.  I believe that the nature of Communism on the Map and Operation 
Abolition represented a drastic shift in message and also strikingly different in tone from 
previous messages of propaganda during the 1940s and 1950s. Those campaigns, while not the 
focus of this study, tended to center around individuals or events which could be labelled as 
communist or communist aligned.  In Operation Abolition, we can see a paradigm shift from this 
earlier concept; the film attempted to implicate all of those who opposed HUAC in a plot to 
lower the guard of the American people.  At ISU, viewers picked up on that broader agenda and 
reacted with either support or distrust, fostering polarization. Student Jack Kartel picked up on 
that atmosphere, writing, “The discussion of a few of the individuals who attempted to be 
openminded and objective about the whole thing fell on deaf or distorting ears. It served only to 
create suspicion that here by George was a real life, godless, bloody fingered communist trying 
to poison the minds of righteous people. The more emotionally directed discussion of the film 
served to fan the embers of suspicion that were already seeded into the audience. Both types of 
discussion combined to make it quite impossible to carry on any sort of constructive inquiry.”86   
It is also important to realize that there was a strong thread of confirmation bias woven 
into the rhetoric of the films.  Communism on the Map portrayed America as the last standing 
bastion of capitalism against the world. The idea that the America was alone and without allies 
alienated all sense of positive feelings towards foreign nations, meaning that any positive thing 
said about another country could be construed as being pro-socialism and thus pro-communism.  
Under such interpretations, any critique of the United States government might represent a plot 
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with ulterior motives to bring down American society from within.  Operation Abolition took 
this message and made it much more specific, in warning that HUAC was being targeted by 
communists who hoped to abolish the committee. This amounted to the creation of a 
confirmation bias, in which the supporters of HUAC and even those who were undecided saw 
any challenge to the film’s merits as an attack on HUAC. Thus, this meant that any opposition 
was a confirmation of the film’s merits and further entrenched supporters while serving as an 
example to those who were apathetic. These two films aimed to prime the audience to accept 
these assumptions, in claiming to defend the fate of the nation.       
In Ames, these community discussions of Operation Abolition and the HUAC also 
prompted reexamination into the media’s role in American politics. Don Whattoff, a student at 
ISU, wrote to the Iowa State Daily on June 2, 1961, expressing an opinion that shifted attention 
toward the supposed ethical duty of journalists and editors. Whattoff argued that communists 
were a subversive lot, making it hard for the government to react fast enough, but also warning 
that the average citizen was not equipped to act against a disguised enemy.87  Thus, Whattoff 
suggested, the duty of defending Americanness “fell on the shoulders of journalists and 
editors.”88 These select few should be obligated to defend the minds of the American public 
against subversion, through careful attention to which stories they submit and those that they 
chose not to publish.89  Whattoff had little to no faith in the individual to act against communism, 
but suggested that mobilizing the power of the press would enable America to protect itself 
against subversion. Significantly, in the same letter, Whattoff also passively denounced HUAC 
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by saying that the organization was incapable of handling the threat of communism as well as the 
press could.  Whattoff stated:  
None of us desires any abridging or deferment of his rights, but at times of 
necessity, we must accept a temporary deferment of certain rights. During a 
shooting war, men do not handle guns in quite the same manner as they do in 
times of peace. By the same token, in the thick of this Cold War men cannot 
handle words and thoughts quite the same as they do in times of peace… And by 
the same token, you as editor of a newspaper have this same responsibility, but to 
a much greater degree.  You are in a position to mold public opinion and mental 
stance, consequently your responsibility is far greater. You are in a position, by 
the stand you take or do not take on each and every issue, to advance the cause of 
freedom or to advance the cause of its mortal enemy.90   
Whatoff’s article amounted to a rejection of HUAC itself alongside a defense of its core beliefs, 
that communists were still a major threat, but arguing that the education and management of said 














CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
The Ames community’s responses to the showing of HUAC’s two prominent propaganda 
films at Iowa State University, as seen in the complaints to ISU president Hilton and in the 
dialogue between letter-writers to the Iowa State Daily and the Ames Daily Tribune, show the 
ways in which Iowans were caught up in the fear and propaganda presented to them or sought to 
resist those forces.  Some supported the propaganda upon solely institutional bounds, while 
others wanted to uphold their own beliefs in American values by proxy through HUAC.  
Discussions ranged from the reevaluation of political rights and the role of the media, to 
strategies for dealing with political dissent. The long history of anti-communism in the U.S. 
created a dichotomy of American identity where its citizens were defined as what they were and 
what they were not.  The question of the validity of anti-communism provides a view into the 
deep political, ideological and societal divides plaguing American society in the early 1960s.  At 
its core, the ideological battle between anti-communists and protestors of HUAC in Iowa, as 
elsewhere in the country, partly reflected the deep political divide between conservatives and 
liberals.  Neither side wanted to give any ground, for fear of losing its entire ideology and thus 
they fought tooth and nail to win out over each other.  
In many ways, HUAC was already under siege when the Ames episode occurred. The 
entire front page of the January 2, 1961 Washington Post  featured a petition to abolish HUAC, 
signed by over two hundred notable national figures, including lawyers, public officials, and 
academics (many from California, who felt that they had been targeted with extreme fervor by 
the HUAC).91 The petitioners did not deny Congress the right of oversight, but were in fact more 
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focused on the abuse of that right.  These critics complained that “The committee has perverted 
and thereby imperiled the proper and necessary powers of the congress to conduct 
investigations…. It has harassed Americans who work for racial equality and justice…. It has 
increased bitterness between racial and religious groups of our citizens which in turn has 
imperiled our good relations with the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America…. It has 
discouraged U.S. students and scholars from studying in countries which we Americans 
desperately need to understand.” 92 
The HUAC was dissolved in 1975, but its history shows how the divisions surrounding 
its ideas and actions reached even rural communities such as Ames, Iowa. The communist scare 
at Iowa State University in 1961 was a public matter; the Ames community held a discussion 
through the local newspapers that lasted the better part of four months, from late March until 
mid-June. The dialogue extended, as citizens read the ongoing coverage, then wrote back to the 
editor to voice their own opinions.  This point represents one of the most significant parts of the 
1961 scare, the way events on ISU’s campus surrounding the showing of Operation Abolition 
brought Iowans into a wider discussion of communism, American patriotism, and community 
values.  
Conservatives backing HUAC saw liberals as blind to the threats at hand.  Liberals saw 
HUAC and its support base as willing to denounce all rights and even transgress the constitution 
to defeat an imagined enemy.  Neither side was going to budge nor compromise. Giving up a 






least in Ames, some believed that American democracy meant that both sides should have a 
chance to be heard.   
These discussions of anti-communism have provided a picture of a high-stakes argument 
that to many Americans, was life or death. This moment in 1961 encapsulates a larger 
ideological struggle against communism and a discussion of where the line between personal 
rights and security should be drawn.  In Ames, these discussions were recorded in letters to the 
editor of local papers. Contained in these letters are the reactions to HUAC propaganda which at 
their core expressed Americans’ views of ideological threats to their identity.  The episode in 
Ames indicates that the midwestern United States was not a backwater that ignored or blindly 
followed national sentiment. Instead, residents actively engaged ideas and controversy, providing 
their own local discourse on Cold War tensions. From supporters of HUAC to HUAC’s critics, 
their stories tell of an ideological battlefield whose catalyst was the viewing of the HUAC films 
Communism on the Map and Operation Abolition. These films provided a metaphorical prodding 
that brought out the underlying political, ideological and social strife which had been lying just 
beneath the surface. What these months in 1961 show is that Iowans were part of a national 
discourse and were contributing their thoughts and beliefs to a problem that the nation was 
facing at large.  All in all, this episode in Ames and ISU history provides a deep insight into what 
Iowans believed was American, at a point in time when the whole idea of America seemed to be 









Primary Sources  
Adams, Donald, “Film Tactics Disgusting, Inexcusable for Congress,” Iowa State Daily, May 18, 
1961.  
Anonymous, “Eleven Groups to Sponsor Movie Sunday,” Iowa State Daily, May 12, 1961.  
Anonymous, “Student Papers Denounce John Birch Approach,” Iowa State Daily, May 11, 1961.  
Bartley, Bob, “Says Film Producers Have Reactionary Motive,” Iowa State Daily, March 29, 
1961. 
Bliss, Patricia, Bliss Report to David A. Norris, 3, Iowa State University Special Collections, The 
James Hilton Papers, Bliss Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52. 
Borchers, Harold, “Film Shocks Writer,” Iowa State Daily, March 17, 1961. 
Cargill, Ken, “Links Film Narration with Birch Society,” Iowa State Daily, May 12, 1961.  
Cartledge, Frank, “Un-American Committees Usurp Rights,” Iowa State Daily, May 10, 1961.  
Curry, Sharon, “Letter to the Editor,” Ames Daily Tribune, May 20, 1961, Iowa State University 
Special Collections, The James Hilton Papers, Bliss Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52. 
Doak, “Communists, Leftists Hope for Effortless World Control Says Prof,” Iowa State Daily, 
May 17, 1961.  
Doak, “Education on Communism No Job for Committee,” Iowa State Daily, April 28, 1961.  
Doak, “No Middle Ground in Left-Right Politics,” Iowa State Daily, April 11, 1961.  
Doak, “Operation Abolition Shown to Students,” Iowa State Daily, April 18, 1961 
Doak, “Showing of HUAC Film Might Prove Educational,” Iowa State Daily, May 11, 1961.  
Doak, Richard K. Bliss Obituary, Ames Tribune, November 24, 2004.  
Doak, “2 Punished for Showing of ‘Operation Abolition’,” Des Moines Register, September 20, 
1961. 
Erickson, Leif, “Were Calif. Students Dupes of Reds,”  The Courier, March 2, 1961.  
Erlandson, D, “Need Committee for Uncovering Insidious Reds,” Iowa State Daily, May 2, 
1961.  
Gaylord, Jill, “Answers Letter on HUAC Film,” Iowa State Daily, May 17, 1961.  
47 
 
Hobbs, E, “Grave Errors by Daily on Birch Society Story,” Iowa State Daily, May 17, 1961.  
Hoover, John E, Communist Target: Youth: Communist Infiltration and Agitation Tactics, 1960. 
Hoover, John E, Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It. 
Henry Holt and Co: New York, 1958  
House Un-American Activities Committee, Operation Abolition. 1960, directed by Fulton Lewis 
III, written by John E. Hoover, accessed February 15, 2018, https://archive.org/details/HUAC-Operation-
Abolition-Film.  
Jumper, Will, “HUAC Film Makes Prof Amused, Bitter,” Iowa State Daily, May 16, 1961.  
Kartel, Jack, “Emotional Appeal in Anti-Red Film,” Iowa State Daily, March 24, 1961. 
Kansas State Collegian, “Students Have Few Views on John Birch Society,” Iowa State Daily, 
April 13, 1961.  
Kennedy, John F, “Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors,” Speech, 
Washington, D.C, April 20th, 1961. JFK library online. https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-
viewer/archives/JFKWHA/1961/JFKWHA-024-001/JFKWHA-024-001 
Norris, David, Summary of the Report, Iowa State University Special Collections, The James 
Hilton Papers, Bliss Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52. 
Norris, David, Ames Community Action Report, Iowa State University Special Collections, The 
James Hilton Papers, Bliss Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52. 
Norris, David, Why are we coming to you? Iowa State University Special Collections, The James 
Hilton Papers, Bliss Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52. 
Pulley, Arden, “Film Promotor Asks Unification Against Enemy,” Iowa State Daily, May 13, 
1961.  
Pulley, Arden, “Must Have Committees Against Reds,” Iowa State Daily, May 5, 1961. 
Pulley, Carole, “Disagrees with Stand on Politics,” Iowa State Daily, April 13, 1961.  
Quad-City Times, “Dr. E. B. Smith at Alcoa Picnic,” Quad-City Times. August 25, 1962.  
Ryan, Stephen, “Letter to Editor,” Iowa State Daily, March 28,1961, Iowa State University 
Special Collections, The James Hilton Papers, Bliss Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52. 
Tripp, Marcai, “U.S. Should Know Marxism,” Iowa State Daily, April 8, 1961.  
The Washington Post, “Petition to the House of the 87th Congress,” The Washington Post, 
January 2, 1961, Iowa State University Special Collections, The John Hilton Papers, Bliss 
Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52. 
48 
 
Wallace, Henry, America’s Thought Police: Record of the Un-American Activities Committee, 
Civil Rights Congress, 1947. Iowa State University Special Collections. The James Hilton 
Papers, Bliss Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52.  
Whattoff, Don, “Price of Liberty,” Ames Daily Tribune, June 2, 1961. Iowa State University 
Special Collections, The James Hilton Papers, Bliss Report, Box no. 15, File no. 52. 
 
Secondary Sources  
Belfrage, Cedric, The American Inquisition: 1945-1960, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1973.  
Bennett, Kenneth, “Four Iowa Newspapers’ Coverage of McCarthyism 1950-54,” Master’s 
Thesis, Iowa State University, 1994, B439. C1. 
Bogle, Lori, The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War, College 
Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2004. 
Burnham, James, The Web of Subversion: Underground Networks in the U.S. Government, New 
York: The John Day Company, 1954. 
Carr, Robert, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1952. 
Caute, David, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower, New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. 
Ceplair, Larry, Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America: A Critical History, Santa 
Barbara: Prauger, 2011. 
Davies, Powell, The Urge to Persecute, Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953.  
Draper, Theodore, American Communism and Soviet Russia, New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2003. 
Fried, Richard, The Russians are Coming! The Russians are Coming!, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998. 
Goodman, Walter, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities, Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc, 1969.   
Iowa State University Archives, “History of Iowa State: People of Distinction: Dr. James H. 
Hilton”, iastate.edu, http://www.public.iastate.edu/~isu150/history/hilton.html 
Lewis, Lionel, Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control, New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988.  
Paddison, Joshua, “Summers of Worry, Summers of Defiance San Franciscans for Academic 
Freedom and Education and the Bay Area Opposition to HUAC, 1959-1960,” California History, 
Vol. 78, No. 3 (Fall, 1999). 
49 
 
Preston, William, Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933, Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1963. 
Schrecker, Ellen, No Ivory Tower, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Storrs, Landon, The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013.  
 
